The last few days have seen the Taiwan dollar surge dramatically against the US dollar, with the Korean won and Singapore dollar also strengthening. Louis says this sudden shift feels like a reversal of the dynamics seen during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which saw Asian currencies crash abruptly. He sat down with Anatole to unpack what triggered these extreme moves and what they might reveal about the outlook for US treasuries, global capital flows, and the future of the US economy.
Transcript
This transcript is machine generated
Louis-Vincent Gave
Hello, everyone. Thanks again for joining for this latest episode of the Gavekal podcast, where Anatole and I catch up to discuss big events. And of course, since we last caught up, there's been way too many big events for us to go through. We'll just perhaps kick off with even just what's happened this week. And we are recording this on the Monday Cinco de Mayo. Happy Cinco de Mayo, Anatole, and to anybody else who celebrates. Anatole, you were just at the IMF. You just came back from Washington. What were your impressions? What's the big takeaways?
Anatole Kaletsky
Well, look, you were saying there've been so many events. And part of the reason we haven't had a chance to have this conversation is we've been too involved in them and writing about them, talking to clients and so on. So, you know, there's a host of things to talk about, the volatility, the craziness that has been inflicted on the markets and the world economy. By the way, the way I've been looking at it and the kind of framework that I've built up talking to clients is you've got to have a very distinct short-term, medium-term, and long-term analysis of this whole thing, of what Trump's doing, the end of American exceptionalism. Is there going to be a recession this year? Which I think there is. But before we go into that, I think we should focus on some big things that have actually been happening in the markets just literally in the last few days, or literally in the last day, which I think are symptomatic of all the craziness that has started, is spreading basically from Washington since the 2nd of April. So, the biggest actually move, everybody was focused on the treasury market, on the stock markets falling by 19% or whatever. But actually, the biggest and weirdest move has been just the one in the last few days in these Asian currencies, especially the smaller Asian currencies like the Taiwan dollar. And you, I think, are speaking from Hong Kong right now, so you're right in the middle of it. So, maybe, why don't we start with that narrower focus of what's been going on with Asian currencies, and then we can broaden it out.
Louis-Vincent Gave
Aha, so you're punting the ball back to me. Yeah. All right, great. All right. No, look, you're absolutely right. It's a big event. You know, I first moved to Asia in the mid-90s. And I might be wrong on this, but from memory, I think this is only the second time I see a six or seven standard deviation move on an Asian currency. The first time, of course...
Anatole Kaletsky
Well, if that's true, then you must have lived for something like five billion years, because that's about how often they're supposed to happen, you know.
Louis-Vincent Gave
It feels like it. You know, they say years in Hong Kong are dogs' years. They count for seven. So, maybe not billions, but I do sometimes feel about 100 years old, especially after the last few months. Having said that, you know, there was one massive currency move in my career in Asia, and that was, of course, the 1997 Asian crisis, when all Asian – well, not all Asian currencies, but most Asian currencies fell anywhere from 30% to 80%. And now, all of a sudden, sort of a little bit out of the blue, you have what historically has been one of the lower vol currencies in Asia, namely the Taiwanese dollar, that has essentially gone up whatever it is now, 11% over the past few trading sessions. And I think this matters tremendously, just like the Asian crisis in 1997 essentially called the end of the Asian carry trades. Because if you remember back then, Anatole, all the Asian currencies were pegged, but interest rates on the Thai baht, on the Malaysian ringgit, the rupiah, the Korean won, etc., were higher than interest rates in the US. So, if you had access to US dollar credit, if you had a private bank account, if you had, if you were a corporate, if you were a financial institution, it made ample sense, or it seemed to make ample sense, to borrow US dollars and put your money in deposits in ringgits or rupiahs or whatever else. And in this way, you just, you know, you reached out for yield, but you, you know, you harvested...
Anatole Kaletsky
You were taking no currency risk, of course.
Louis-Vincent Gave
Of course, it was pegged. It was pegged. So, you were essentially harvesting a free carry trade. Now, you know, I'm going to be a bit vulgar, but I was taught early on through this Asian crisis that essentially when you make money with carry trades, you eat like a bird and you poop like a cow. And, of course, that's what's happened to all the carry trade players in Asia in 97. And essentially, we've seen... I think we're seeing the reverse of that right now, where for the past few years, if you were a pension fund manager in Korea, an insurance company in Taiwan, a pension fund in Singapore, Thailand, in Japan, etc., you went out and you bought U.S. treasuries that were essentially yielding typically anywhere from 150 to 350 basis points more than your own government bond markets. Plus, your own currency was going down every year between 3% and 5% a year against the U.S. dollar, almost like clockwork.
Anatole Kaletsky
So, again, you were getting carry and there was no currency risk.
Louis-Vincent Gave
And it seemed like there was no currency risk.
Anatole Kaletsky
That’s what I mean, yeah.
Louis-Vincent Gave
You were making 7%, 8% a year with very little problems. And lo and behold, going back to the idea of eating like a bird and pooping like a cow, in the space of two days, if you're a Taiwanese pension fund or insurance company or whatever, in the past two days, you've essentially lost two years' worth of profits. And so, leaving you with a question of what you do now... And by the way, it's not just Taiwan. You've had big moves in Korea. You've had big moves in Singapore. Malaysia is starting to move. So, to me, it has a very sort of Asian crisis in reverse feel to it.
And I think it's a super important development because for the past, really, since the Asian crisis, Asian savings have not only been massive, but they've had this tendency to be redeployed into U.S. treasuries. And now, all of a sudden, that trade no longer looks like the one-way slam dunk that it had been for so long. So, as we sort of take a step back, if the Asian crisis essentially guaranteed that for 25 years, 30 years, capital would flow from Asia and into the U.S. treasury market and other long-dated U.S. assets, if the Asian crisis essentially meant a massive transfer of purchasing power from the Asian consumer to the U.S. consumer, then the reverse Asian crisis that we are now going through essentially reverses all of these trends. And so, no, look, I think this Six Sigma, Seven Sigma move on currencies that we are witnessing is super, super important. And if it continues to spread across the region as it seems to be spreading, we shouldn't hide the fact that it's going to have massive investment implications.
Anatole Kaletsky
And so, what do you think is the trigger? Is it just that things got overweight or is it risk aversion? Or is it perhaps part of these trade talks that are going on with the U.S. presumably putting pressure on all its trading partners to revalue their currencies? What's going on, do you think?
Louis-Vincent Gave
That would seem like a likely explanation, right? The fact that the moves happened first in Taiwan, then in Korea, the two countries that are undeniably the most dependent on the U.S. for their security umbrella. The fact that, you know, the biggest currency moves occurred there would seem to indicate that, you know, this could be the result of U.S. pressures. And because there is no doubt that Asian currencies today are stupidly undervalued. You know, it's, you know, Treasury Secretary Besant made this point time and time again, how the world needed a new Bretton Woods system, which he called the Mar-a-Lago, a new Mar-a-Lago accord and all that. So, it could be undeniably the result of this.
But note that it's not just Korea and Taiwan that are moving. You know, Malaysia, which, you know, hasn't really been a super strong U.S. ally, is also now on the move. China, you know, the Renminbi broke, the CNH, the offshore Renminbi, broke through 720 this morning and is basically back at the levels of the days of the U.S. election, which incidentally, just as an aside, really, I think these moves blow a huge hole in the sort of market belief that tariffs, trade wars, etc., would strengthen the U.S. dollar. Very clearly, it's gone precisely the other way. A discussion that you and I, if you remember, had back in July.
Anatole Kaletsky
And that's something, to our credit, I think both you and I were skeptical of that. Absolutely. There was a very clear consensus way back in October because, actually, you know, the trade flows, you know, the theory that the tariffs will strengthen a currency always depended on the idea that, oh, well, you impose your tariffs, that means you're going to be importing less from the rest of the world, and that means your currency will strengthen. But we've all known for the last 20 years that trade flows are only a very small, you know, almost irrelevant influence on our currency levels. And this is why you and I were skeptical about this, you know, way back, even a year or more ago, because, you know, if a small shift in trade flows leads to a big shift in investment expectations and capital flows, which seems to be what's been going on, then, of course, that will completely, it will be the capital flows that dominate overwhelmingly.
Louis-Vincent Gave
So I was about to say this. I was literally, that is such an important point. And, you know, going back to your question, you know, why suddenly, why is this happening? Is this U.S. pressure? Or is it simply, you know, the reality that if you're a foreigner today, the one thing that, there's one message that comes out very clearly out of the Trump administration is we want to make foreigners pay for our mistakes of the past. We have this 37 trillion debt and frankly, foreigners should pay. It's, it, to me, it reminds me, you know, growing up in France, you learn about how post-World War I, policy makers kept saying, Germany will pay, Germany will pay. And when I listen to the Trump administration today, it's, well, you know what? We'll sell $5 million cards and get all the world's best entrepreneurs to move here and they'll fight, fight to, to, to come pay our taxes. Turns out that doesn't happen. Then they turn around and they say, okay, well, we'll fund the deficit through tariffs. And then of course, the math there simply don't work. Then you turn around and you start to say, well, you know what? Maybe we can impose special capital gains taxes or special income taxes on the foreigners for them to have the privilege to come use our capital markets. And, you know, the more you hear these things as a foreigner and both you and I are foreigners, you're British, I'm French, the, you hear these things and you think, well, you know what? Maybe the US is no longer the place I want to deploy as much of my capital as I've had deploy, deployed up until recently.
So bottom line is, I'm not sure really what was the trigger for these moves. On the flip side, you know, I'm not sure it really matters. Like these moves are now occurring. This is what matters. You know, what caused it, you know, it'll be for the historians to figure out. Meanwhile, what matters to us as investors is the consequences of these moves. And for me, the consequences are very bearish for US treasuries, bearish for all long dated US assets. I think it leads to much steeper yield curves. It leads to a structurally weaker US dollar. And I think it's a tremendous transfer of purchasing power from the West to the East. And, you know, it should be very, very good for local stock markets here.
And frankly, for emerging markets in general, because, you know, I think if you take a step back and you think, you know, today if I'm the central banker of South Africa or Chile or Colombia or wherever else or Indonesia, you know, suddenly I'm dealing with a world where all prices are low, food prices are decently low, the US dollar is going down, and China is stimulating very aggressively. Well, if I'm a Niamh central banker, that's about as good as it gets. That's like Christmas come early. I mean, what else could I ask for aside from weak oil, weak food, weak dollars, stronger China? That's as good as it gets. And so, you know, I think, you know, most people just aren't positioned at all for this world. Most people have had portfolios essentially built either on momentum, i.e. I buy the S&P 500, I buy the Nasdaq, or playing this carry trade that we just highlighted. But people forgot that there are three ways to make money. You can make money on momentum trades, you can make money on carry trades, or you can make money on return to the mean trades. Now, the fact that the momentum trades have died and the fact that the carry trades have died tell me that we're entering a new phase where the return to the mean trades will now kick off.
Anatole Kaletsky
And valuations start to matter. This is something I've been talking to clients about a lot. You know, valuations start to matter in equities. They start to matter in bonds in terms of you look at the level of real interest rates and where I think actually the most dangerous bond market right now is probably the European one where real rates are still zero or half a percent. In the US, the tips are already yielding 2%. But I think most importantly, valuations can start to matter in currencies as well. And the gap that has opened up between the dollar on the one hand and the yen and quite a number of other Asian currencies on the other is completely unprecedented in valuations. And in a way, what you've just done is answer a question that I was going to put to you but I want to put it more narrowly in that you were talking about the shift from momentum trade to return to the mean. But just very specifically on this currency move, I think the implication of what you're saying is that this kind of these very extreme moves that we've seen in the last few days are not a final capitulation at the end of a trend. They're actually the first gap which begins a long trend. And you think we're still much nearer the beginning of the weak dollar trade than we are at the end?
Louis-Vincent Gave
Absolutely. Absolutely. But so now on this note, let me, you were just in Washington, D.C. for the IMF meeting. You saw Scott Bessent speak. What were, let me, you know, punt it back to you now. Yeah. And, you know, what were your main takeaway from all of this? Were, did people in Washington seem worried about the falling dollar or embracing it? Or, yeah, what was your main takeaway?
Anatole Kaletsky
Well, what I can say is not just my own main takeaway, but talking to a few sort of dozens of institutions there, but also the J.P. Morgan event, which I was part of, which always runs in parallel with the IMF where they have literally hundreds of the top institutions in the world and they do very detailed surveys of what they think, the number one conclusion that Joyce Chan, the head of macro research, started out with, and I think they just published this a day or two ago, is, or at least, yeah, the number one conclusion is that the gap that has now opened up between the perceptions of American investors on the one hand and investors from the rest of the world on the other is something that they have not seen, Joyce was saying, in her entire career. There are, you know, completely different worldviews in that everybody agrees the world's very volatile, it's all, you know, there's a lot of crazy and incomprehensible stuff going on, but we also agree that ultimately things will settle down to some kind of new normal.
And the real gap is between the American view that once things settle down, the new normal will not be too different from the way things have been over the last 15, 20, arguably actually 30 or 40 years, U.S. continuing to outperform, U.S. continuing to lead in technology and innovation, the dollar continuing, obviously, to be the, you know, the dominant reserve currency. It's not going to be that different. There will be changes at the margin. Maybe the U.S. won't be 70% of global capitalization, but 68% or 65%, but nothing fundamentals changing. And the view among non-American investors, which is now much more strongly towards the idea that this is not just a change in policy, what we're seeing today.
This is a change in economic regime. It's a change in the whole structure of the world economy and therefore financial markets and relative valuations, where obviously it's not 100%, but, you know, the data seem to be like about 70 or 80% of foreign investors think that we're really at a transfer, at a structural transformation point, and about 70 or 80% of American investors believe that, yeah, we're in a kind of cyclical, we're at a cyclical pivot, we're at a period of, you know, who knows what politics is going to be, but basically once things settle down, they won't be too different. So I think that's the biggest thing. And that I think we can, and also talking to clients, I spent two weeks…
Louis-Vincent Gave
Which one do you believe?
Anatole Kaletsky
Sorry, no, no, so let me tell you what I believe. What I believe in is this, or at least the framework I've come up with is to think about what's going on, as one always has to about time horizons, but there are always three time horizons, the short term, you know, they trade a time horizon, the medium term, what's happening cyclically, and then the long term, what's really happening kind of structurally to transform the world. But I think this is more relevant than usual right now because my answer to you is that working the other way, starting with the very long term big picture, is this, are we really witnessing the great rotation at the end of decades, perhaps even generations of American dominance, American exceptionalism? Is this the end of the American century?
My answer to that is, I don't know. I think it's possible, but I think it seems more possible now than at any time, certainly in the last 50, or 20 years. I don't know, but what I know for certain is that actually nobody knows and nobody will know with any certainty until the end of this decade or perhaps even the middle of the next decade. Because when you're talking about leadership and science and technology, even kind of the military balance between America and China and what's going, these are things things that will evolve over periods of years. So we don't know, but it is a possibility in a way that it hasn't been. The end of American exceptionalism is a distinct possibility that has to be thought about seriously in a way that it hasn't been for the last 15 or 20 years or perhaps longer.
But the second thing I know is that what the market believes about the structural change between America and the rest of the world will be very, very heavily influenced by what happens in the next six or nine months. So the ultimate truth may be that after all Euro-America will remain the sole superpower, etc., etc. But if in the next six to nine months, the U.S. economy sinks into a recession and an inflationary recession, the first genuine stagflation that we've seen anywhere in the developed world since the 1980s, if America falls into this recession and secondly, which I believe is quite likely, that the American recession will be much more serious and much deeper than any kind of slowdown or downturn that we see either in Europe or in China, if that happens, then people will start to believe in the end of the American century. Whether that ends up being true a decade or not, who the hell cares, people will really start to believe that the structural transformation in the world economy and the financial markets is with us and we have to be part of it and this is the beginning of a trend.
And I personally think that, you know, the two somewhat non and very non-consensus views I have is first, somewhat non-consensus. I think that a recession in America is more or less baked in the cake already and I'm somebody who's spent the last two and a half years going around clients and saying, you know, everybody's telling you there's going to be a recession in 22 and 23 and 24. Don't believe them there's not going to be a recession. The fiscal stimulus is too great. The Fed tightening is not sufficient to generate a recession.
Now I think all the conditions are in place for a genuine U.S. recession and I don't just mean two quarters of minus 0.1% GDP but a recession means unemployment going up to at least 5, 5.5% and as Jamie Dimon said I think very wisely in Washington two weeks ago, a recession, whatever it looks like in retrospect on the chart of GDP, it might look like a very small blip. At the time of the recession people feel that things are really bad and if people don't feel that things are really bad, then it's not a real recession. Then it's just a technical blip. So I believe America is moving into that period and we can discuss the reasons why.
I also believe more controversially that this will be the first recession in 30 years, arguably even 40 or 50 years, which will be more serious in America than in every other major economy in the world. So the cliche about how when America sneezes, the rest of the world catches pneumonia, this time is going to be reversed. If that turns out to be true, I think it will transform the view of American exceptionalism and make what I frankly feel is the overconfidence and complacency that we see in the US markets today look very premature and very foolish.
Now, finally, a very short thing about the very short term. Ironically, I think the fact that the markets have rebounded the way they have, both equities and even treasuries, everything apart from the dollars rebounded since April 2, actually makes the recession more likely. Because what that means is that Trump is now under no further pressure to row back any of his policies of the kind that he faced three weeks ago in Europe. Two weeks ago when I was in Washington, everybody said, well, actually the most powerful man in this town is Scott Besant, because he represents the bond market and the Trump has to listen to him. Sadly, I think Scott Besant is probably no longer powerful because the market, he doesn't have the market, you know, fighting on his side. So probably by next week, probably Peter Navarro will become the most powerful man again. So I think that's the way I'm looking at the present situation.
Louis-Vincent Gave
So I don't disagree with anything you said. You know, I've written…
Anatole Kaletsky
Sorry, that makes it boring.
Louis-Vincent Gave
No, no, no, it's okay. We can, we're allowed to agree sometimes. But like you, like you, I've argued that we are heading into a US recession and that indeed this could be the first time in my career where frankly the US underwhelms and even decelerates while other parts of the world may well accelerate. Europe, China on the back of fiscal stimulus are obviously the two big economic zones that matter in this world. But you mentioned the 1970s stagflation. And I think, you know, going, looking back on it, one of the sort of crystal clear moments of that malaise that the US endured was, you know, President Carter putting on a sweater and going on TV and telling Americans to turn down the thermostat, right? That's one of those images that got seared in people's brains because, you know, telling Americans to consume less is about the most un-American thing that you can do.
And I highlight this because it struck me, and I actually tweeted about this, President Trump just did that. He went on ABC and in an almost like let them eat cake moment, told the interviewers, well, you know what, you know, maybe little girls don't need 30 dolls, they can have two dolls, and maybe little boys don't need 200 pencils, they can make do with five pencils. And I listened to this and I thought first, of course, it's easy to say when you're a billionaire, et cetera. But, you know, but leaving aside the let them eat cake moment, how un-American does that sound? You know, you guys go out there and just consume a whole lot less. That, you know, it left me thinking that, you know, if that is now the message that America's leadership is passing on to consumers, an economy that is 70% consumption, then yes, the US will, is heading into a recession. If you have your leadership coming out there telling you go out and consume less, then that's where we're heading.
Anatole Kaletsky
Yep, yep. No, I think that's right. And I think people are overestimating the relevance of the Trump put, not just the strike price, but actually I think they're overestimating even the existence of the Trump put out because I've been as astonished as anybody by Trump's willingness to go out and say to Americans, you know, you're going to have to, I'm going to have to inflict some pain on you before the promised land, you know, before the election. He was saying, you know, today is the beginning of the new golden age. I mean, that was his inaugural speech. It begins today. He didn't say it begins in 18 months’ time after, you know, you've put on some hair shirts. So, this is a complete transformation.
And, you know, like most observers, I actually thought that if Trump was confronted with the choice between pursuing his economic nationalism agenda and trying to maintain a strongly growing and kind of more or less stable price economy, he would choose, you know, strong growth and price stability every time. But that has turned out to be wrong. And what I think politically is misunderstood is perhaps Trump actually doesn't care about being unpopular. After all, he has been, he was the most unpopular president in American history between 2016 and 20, and then Joe Biden managed to beat him at that. But, you know, during his first presidency, he was the most unpopular president in American history on average, not among his own supporters, but on average. Now his popularity is even lower. But actually, maybe he doesn't give a damn because he's, you know, realistically, he's not going to run for a third term. I bet he would like J.D. Vance to follow him or Rubio or whatever to follow him, but he doesn't actually care about other people either, so actually he doesn't give a damn who follows him.
So actually, you know, maybe he just sees the next year before the congressional elections, or maybe even the next three years when he's in theory a lame duck, but if he can rule by just overriding Congress, just as his opportunity to put his mark on the world, maybe do a bit of trading on the side, you know, with all the volatility, maybe he'll just go on doing that, you know. Now the one thing that could act as the sort of deus ex machina that completely reverses this, and also to introduce a bit of disagreement into this conversation, the one thing that could save him is if oil prices…
Louis-Vincent Gave
I disagree.
Anatole Kaletsky
…go down to $40 a barrel, maybe that avoids the inflation, and that in turn avoids the reduction in real purchasing power, and maybe they dodge the bullet that way. So why do you disagree? First of all, do you disagree that they will go down to that level, or that even if they went to that level, it would help?
Louis-Vincent Gave
I disagree that them going down to that level saves them. I think oil at $60 is perfect because the shale guys don't go bust, and remember, 17% of non-investment grade debt in the US is energy producers. So the problem is if you go below $60 and stay there for a meaningful period of time, you start to see big bankruptcies. You end up basically where you were in 2015, where spreads start to blow out. Remember, you have record amounts of corporate debt to roll over in the second half of this year, first half of 2016. This is like the next big issue to come up, is all this corporate debt roll over. Five years ago, cost of capital was free, everybody was given free money, every corporate tapped the bond market and used the money to buy back shares, and now you have to roll over this debt. So if the oil goes below $60, essentially 17% of your high-yield issuers can't roll over their debt. I mean, that's the simple reality. You have massive layoffs in the energy patch. You get serious economic pain.
And so yes, you could say, well, you know what, it comes out in the wash because that's great for everyone, but $60, gasoline is not expensive today in the United States. It is not expensive. Meanwhile, the amount that your average Americans spend on gasoline right now isn't that high. Meanwhile, what's happening already is that insurance costs for cars, insurance costs for houses are starting to accelerate very rapidly because of the high replacement costs linked to the tariffs. So, yes, maybe you save a little on gasoline, but does that compensate for your higher car insurance, your higher home insurance, et cetera, or simply the fact that you work in the energy patch and you lose your job? It's a, I think it's a, it'd be an unstable equilibrium, and I do think oil below 60 bucks, again, for a meaningful period of time, probably creates more problems than it solves for President Trump.
Anatole Kaletsky
Yeah, I'm inclined to agree with that, and I think they're both very good points about the high-yield debt market, but even more, I think, important is the impact on inflation. Now, the assumption that people are making, I think including the White House, is that at the very least, if the oil price keeps falling, it will save them from the inflationary aspect of stagflation. So, yeah, maybe we'll have a recession, but at least it won't be inflation, and what everybody's concluded over the last few years is that inflation is much more unpopular than recession. So, yeah, maybe you can have a six-month, nine-month recession, unemployment spikes to five and a half, six percent, but as long as inflation remains under control, it's not too bad.
But I think the point you've made is very important, that energy prices may be the dominant influence on inflation on the way up, but it does not necessarily mean that they will be equally dominant on the way down, especially if we now have this unique situation where policy is actually driving up other prices, and crucially, other prices of also essential goods, not just sort of luxuries and so on, essential goods which people buy in the stores all the time.
You know, one of the psychological reasons why energy prices have always been so important in determining inflation is that energy is something that people buy, especially in America, every week. You know, they fill up their car with gas, so they're very aware. So when you have these high-frequency prices, they go up, it gives people the impression that inflation is high. Now, oil at $40 or $50, even $60 will help with that, but if meanwhile, not just food prices are going up, but prices of clothes, of toys for your kids, of your garden equipment, all the small things are going up, which they have not been for the last 40 years. There's been no inflation at all in everyday consumer goods. Now, if we start seeing inflation in everyday consumer goods, even if they don't represent a very high proportion of the CPI, they will have an equal psychological effect to offset the falling gas prices. So, I agree with you. I don't think this is going to be the salvation, but it's perhaps the one remaining hope that they have.
Louis-Vincent Gave
See, I think the real bite will be home insurance and car insurance and local taxes that are also rising rapidly. Well, look, Anatole, we've probably tested our listeners' patience. Thanks a bunch for jumping on a call. I know you've been super busy and I'm sure that between now and the time we chat again, many more things will happen. I think we need to be a little more diligent about doing these a little more often. But once again, thanks for joining me today, Anatole.
